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The welfarist account of enhancement and disability
holds enhanced and disabled states on a spectrum: the
former are biological or psychological states that increase
the chances of a person leading a good life in the
relevant set of circumstances, while the latter decrease
those chances. Here, I focus on a particular issue raised
by this account: what should we count as part of an
individual’s relevant set of circumstances when thinking
about enhanced and disabled states? Specifically, is
social prejudice relevant to an individual’s circumstances
in regards to how disabled or enhanced they are? For
instance, if an individual is discriminated against on the
basis of their skin colour, and this leads to a reduction
in their well-being, the welfarist account suggests that
their skin colour is a disability. To avoid such a seeming
mislabel, Savulescu and Kahane have argued for
excluding social prejudice from counting as a relevant
circumstance to their welfarist definition of disability.
I argue, however, that this exclusion of social prejudice
is unsatisfactory and incompatible with the goals of this
account.
Enhancement and disability are contentious con-
cepts. Suppose you have access to a safe drug that
allows you to draft manuscripts with astonishing
speed, clarity and insight, while I, after a severe
blow to the head, permanently find reading
impossible as words now seem to keep
jumping across the page. Are these changes to our
respective capacities instances of enhancement
and disability?
The welfarist account of these concepts gives an
unusual answer: it depends. If your new ability to
mass produce great manuscripts is likely to make
your life go better, while my inability to read is
likely to make my life go worse, then yes—you
have been enhanced and I disabled. On the other
hand, had we both been living in illiterate societies
or eras with no use for reading or writing, then it is
not clear there is anything enhancing or disabling
about our new capacities. This is because, for the
welfarist account, whether a loss or gain in capaci-
ties is enhancing or disabling depends on how such
changes to our bodies and minds impact our well-
being in our given circumstances.
To be more precise, the welfarist account defines an
enhanced state as:
Any state of a person’s biology or psychology
which increases the chances of leading a good life
in the relevant set of circumstances.1
Hand in hand with this, the account defines a dis-
abled state as:
Any state of a person’s biology or psychology
which decreases the chances of leading a good life
in the relevant set of circumstances.1
There are a number of counterintuitive implica-
tions to these definitions. For one, it suggests that
even a loss or diminishment in a capacity may be
enhancing for a person; for instance, a decline in
the recall ability of someone suffering from post-
traumatic stress disorder may improve their well-
being overall, and therefore, count as an
enhancement.2
While we will explore some of the other implica-
tions of this approach below, the prime focus here
will be on the significance of this notion of ‘rele-
vant set of circumstances’. What constitutes these
and what makes a given circumstance relevant or
irrelevant when determining whether a state is
enhancing or disabling? The obvious answer would
seem to be that, if our focus is on the well-being of
a person, then we ought to include whatever cir-
cumstances are relevant to that person’s well-being.
These may be physical, sociocultural, personal or
anything else conceivably relevant to a person’s
well-being.
But consider one side effect of such inclusive-
ness. We may call this the ‘mislabelling objec-
tion’i—the key issue that will occupy our concerns
here. Imagine a person with dark skin in a set of
circumstances where there is social prejudice
against people with dark skin. If that prejudice
reduces their chances of leading a good life, the
welfarist account would have us conclude that dark
skin (in such circumstances) is a disability. This
seems strange; possibly offensively so. Is it relevant
or coherent to call that person disabled? And were
all, say, black slaves in the Americas disabled?
Moreover, if a dark-skinned person in a racist
society underwent some intervention that gave
them paler skin, presuming this improves their
well-being by allowing them to sidestep prejudice,
are they now enhanced?
Such a dubious use of labels seems problematic
for the welfarist account. Or, at least, in introdu-
cing and elaborating on their welfarist definition of
disability, Savulescu and Kahane imply that it is.3 4
In fact, as we will see, they hold this as sufficiently
troublesome so as to justify excluding social preju-
dice from the relevant circumstances that impact an
individual’s well-being when defining disability.
That is, while the welfarist account holds any given
bodily or mental state as potentially enhancing or
iI thank Mike King for this way of phrasing it.
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disabling, if that state or any change to it improves or diminishes
a person’s well-being solely due to it being subject to social
prejudice, then this considered a separate matter. The impact of
social prejudice on well-being is simply not relevant to questions
of enhancement and disability. We ought to deal with social
prejudice by combating it, not by allowing it to determine
whether someone has bodily or mental states that are enhancing
or disabling. Or so Savulescu and Kahane have argued.3
While this may appear to sidestep the mislabelling objection,
I will argue that it also defeats the purpose of the welfarist
account. As we are about to see, the attractiveness of this
account is in its ability to avoid a number of the conceptual dif-
ficulties facing other definitions of these concepts. It does so by
offering a non-moralised, prudential account of them. However,
by excluding social prejudice from the relevant circumstances,
I argue the account ultimately loses this distinguishing feature.
To state the argument to be presented simply: in trying to avoid
the mislabelling objection, Savulescu and Kahane end up retreat-
ing to the very position that the welfarist account was designed
to avoid. To see how, let us explore what that position is and
how the welfarist account is meant to evade it.
ELABORATING ON THE WELFARIST ACCOUNT
As we have seen, the primary concern of the welfarist account is
well-being—or, more precisely, how a specific individual’s bio-
logical and/or psychological states affect their chances of leading
a good life, which I take to refer to their well-being. It is the
impact of those states on a person’s well-being that determines
whether they are advantageous or disadvantageous, enhancing
or disabling. In other words, the primary concern here is what
is of prudential value to a person.
As Savulescu and Kahane make clear:
If something leads to a reduction in someone’s wellbeing, then
that thing is bad for that person. This means that if something is
a disability in our [welfarist] sense, then it is also a condition that
makes life worse.4
Likewise, we might add, if something increases someone’s
well-being, then that thing is good for that person. Hence,
enhancements here are any changes to one’s biology or psych-
ology that tend towards that end: increasing their chances of
leading a good life.ii What all this implies is that enhancements
are simply alleviations of disabilities—that is, alleviations of
bodily and mental states that are obstacles to greater well-being.
This point tells us what the account holds a person enhanced
or disabled relative to: a person does not become enhanced or
disabled relative to their previous capacities, and certainly not
relative to the typical functioning of their species. Instead, they
are enhanced or disabled relative to how well their life could
possibly go given certain bodily and mental states.
This has a further counterintuitive implication: we are all dis-
abled all the time, and to varying degrees. This is because we all
arguably possess mental and bodily states that get in the way of
us leading better lives. Hence, even a highly enhanced ‘posthu-
man’ may nevertheless be disabled on this account.
Unusual as this may seem, the key here is to remember that
this is a stipulative account of these concepts: the account stems
from a premise that our more common conceptions of these
terms are inadequate and in need of upgrading if they are to
capture what is of relevance to the nature and ethics of enhance-
ment and disability.
To see how inadequate these more common conceptions are,
note how they are typically expressed. Enhancement is most
often characterised in functional terms as an intervention that
augments our capacities in some way,5 6 or more specifically, as
an intervention that does so in a manner that goes beyond
merely restoring health or preventing illness.7–10 In contrast,
disability is often broadly understood in medical terms as some
unfortunate deviation from species-typical functioning.11–13 iii
While the conceptual problems facing these accounts are
numerous,1–4 14 what unites them is their failure to say anything
about how disabled and enhanced states relate to well-being. On
these functionalist accounts, a person who augments, say, their
auditory capacities so they can hear everything within a mile has
been enhanced, even if such a capacity leaves them chronically
distracted and ultimately deeply neurotic (and therefore, we can
assume, unable to lead a good life). Similarly on these accounts,
a person who falls below species-typical functioning by becom-
ing, say, deaf, is considered disabled, even if they are leading a
life of much higher well-being than they otherwise would have
due to, say, their enthusiastic immersion in a rich deaf culture,
their enjoyment of a heightened sense of touch, along with the
fact that they simply have no desire to hear.
More importantly, these accounts raise the question of what
the moral relevance is of standards like species-typical function-
ing or ‘normal’ functioning. By defining these terms relative to
one’s prior state of health or one’s species-typical functioning,
the implication is that these standards serve as morally relevant
reference points in and of themselves. And yet, without explicat-
ing how these reference point or boundaries are relevant to
well-being, or at least some other uncontroversial value, their
usage in characterising enhancement and disability reflects an
arbitrarily moralised stance on the matter. On the other hand,
what is the moral relevance of people leading a better or worse
life? Some would say that is all that morally matters, or at least,
it is certainly a cornerstone of what is relevant to ethics.
As such, by tying these concepts to well-being, the welfarist
account allows us to avoid the moralised starting points and ter-
minological controversies at the core of other accounts. It pro-
vides an inherently normative approach, giving us prima facie
reasons to address conditions that are making an individual’s
life worse, as well as helping us understand why enhanced states
can be desirable to begin with.1 This sets the groundwork for a
germane and coherent framework from which to then think
about what is at stake in regards to enhancement and disability
without having to rely on controversial references to ‘normality’
or other morally arbitrary standards of functioning. In that way,
the welfarist account sidesteps this moralising pitfall and keeps
the focus on what actually matters in a given case: a person’s
well-being.
Nevertheless, this key advantage aside, a number of criticisms
have been levelled against the welfarist account. Most of these
have focused on its definition of enhancement, although they
apply in similar ways to its definition of disability. For instance,
iiWhy the emphasis on ‘any’? Again, this points to the focus on
prudential value here. It is not relevant what the biological or
psychological state is or what the nature of the change to that state
might be (eg, drug-based or education-based). What matters here is how
that state (or how a change to that state) impacts well-being.
iiiThere is also the social model of disability, which sees disability as
resulting not from any impairment or dysfunction, but from an unjust
failure of society to accommodate differently abled or impaired
individuals. We will examine how this model relates to the welfarist
account in a later section.
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it may be argued that this account loses contact with the every-
day language use of the term enhancement,15 making it otiose
since it does not explicitly distinguish therapy from enhance-
ment.16 Others have suggested it is too dependent on the con-
tested notion of a good life or well-being,17 and that it risks
underestimating social pressures that influence individual choice,
as well as the collective consequences of enhancement.18 19
I have previously argued that these criticisms are either
unfounded or addressable.14 What remains troubling about this
account, however, is its emphasis on the ‘relevant circum-
stances’, and here we finally hone back in on the central issue.
To start us off, why does it place such emphasis on a person’s
circumstances in its definitions of enhanced and disabled states?
The reason is straightforward: what makes leading a good life
easier in one circumstance, may make it harder in another. One
example Savulescu and Kahane give is our disposition to rest
and store excess calories as fat: such a disposition is clearly
advantageous in a set of circumstances where resources are
limited, but it can lead to ultimately lethal consequences where
there is an overabundance of resources.4 Similarly, while deaf-
ness is generally deemed a disadvantageous lack of a capacity, it
may arguably be an advantage in an environment of consistently
loud and extremely distracting noise. Even something as
extreme as a brainstem stroke that leaves an individual unable to
speak or move—most would agree that such a condition
severely limits one’s chances of leading a good life. Yet surely
that is true only in relation to our broader circumstances. For
instance, had we telepathic and telekinetic powers—that is, had
our circumstances as human beings been very different—then
perhaps such a lesion to the brain would not be considered so
disabling (presuming the stroke did not affect those powers as
well).
What this shows is that there is no context-independent
answer to the question of whether a state increases or decreases
the chances of leading a good life. The particular circumstances
of the individual (which may include everything from the type
of universe they inhabit, to their surrounding culture, to their
personal life goals and desires) clearly play a determining role in
answering that question.
And yet, this brings us back to the central conundrum raised
briefly at the start: a person with dark skin whose set of (in this
case, social) circumstances include prejudice against dark skin.
The welfarist account may (mis?)label that person as disabled.
Let us explore the nature of this mislabelling objection in more
detail, including what it might mean for enhanced states.
THE MISLABELLING OBJECTION
Again, consider a person with dark skin who lives in a racist
society that diminishes their well-being by discriminating against
dark-skinned individuals. Moreover, imagine this person hears
of a new intervention that promises to make them significantly
paler. Not wanting to spend their lives battling unjust discrimin-
ation, they agree to undergo it, and as a result are not discrimi-
nated against as often, increasing their prospects and income,
and ultimately their level of well-being.iv
According to the welfarist account, this person has been
enhanced. Indeed, since enhancements on this account are alle-
viations of disabilities, this person was disabled: they possessed
a biological state or property (dark skin) that reduced their
chances of leading a good life in their circumstances. Similarly,
the account suggests that the homosexual who becomes hetero-
sexual in a homophobic society, or even the woman who reas-
signs her gender in a misogynistic one, have become enhanced,
if they are prudentially better off because of the change.
Furthermore, those who do not undergo these modifications
may be said to live with a disability.
Or consider societies where girls who have not undergone
some form of female genital mutilation (FGM) are discriminated
against, so much so that (we will presume) the loss of well-being
from such a practice is outweighed by the loss of life prospects
and basic, decent treatment by other members of her society.
The welfarist account may have us label women who have
undergone FGM as ‘enhanced’, with new interventions that
facilitate that practice as ‘enhancement technologies’. Indeed,
according to the welfarist account, having a clitoris in such cir-
cumstances may count as a disability.
In these scenarios, the use of these labels seems troubling. On
the one hand, the mislabelling objections acts to pump an intu-
ition that something has gone amiss here—the account has
simply lost the plot. And there may be good consequentialist
reasons for thinking that. Superficially at least, there appears to
be something politically incorrect here. Calling a pale skinned
person or a straight person enhanced compared with being
dark-skinned or gay—some may wish to argue that such labels
are harmful regardless of the circumstances. And one reason for
that might be that the use of these terms may act to validate or
play into the already existing injustice within those societies. For
instance, by labelling a girl who has had her clitoris removed
enhanced, there may be a concern that such a positive label
could reinforce the social forces behind the practice. Similarly,
the ‘disabled’ who fail or refuse to undergo the ‘enhancement’
might risk further discrimination thanks to the stigmatising con-
notations that may be associated with the mere label of disabled.
This may include subtler forms of discrimination such as aver-
sive disablism: an unconscious prejudice against individuals con-
sidered disabled due to a belief that they are inferior to
others.20
Moreover, there might be a concern that controversial
enhancements on this account could be more easily assimilated
as treatments within medicine. For instance, if being gay can be
coherently labelled a disability—and it can be coherently
labelled so on the welfarist account, given the right circum-
stances—then this may act in the favour of medicalising being
gay and offering treatments for it. Indeed, it may help medical-
ise whatever biological or psychological states that victims of
prejudice possess, further propagating the notion that they
embody some lamentable deficiency.21
Nevertheless, the proponent of the welfarist account has a
straightforward response to these concerns. First, we should
remember that this account is not trying to define what types of
biological or psychological states are inherently better. Rather, it
is trying to capture what may be better or worse for a person in
their circumstances—that is, what may be advantageous or dis-
advantageous for them. And, it is a matter of fact that being,
say, gay or dark-skinned for some people in some circumstances
is worse for them than being straight or white. It is purely this
prudential dimension of their states that this account strives to
capture. And while it may be true that there are negative conno-
tations that follow from the label disabled, this is only due to an
ivIt is possible that some accounts of well-being would not consider this
a genuine increase in well-being. Perhaps an objective list theory of
well-being might classify conceding to prejudice to be incompatible with
leading a good life. However, objective lists tend to take into account
pleasure and informed desires. It is uncontroversial to assume that
hedonistic or desire satisfaction accounts of well-being may consider this
an instance of genuine increased well-being.
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understanding of disability as some morally relevant deviation
from normality, or as some condition warranting medical atten-
tion. Yet it is precisely such an understanding of disability that
the welfarist account seeks to move us away from.
Furthermore, if the interventions discussed here (eg,
somehow changing a person’s sexual orientation to a conform-
ing standard) were deemed to promote injustice, the welfarist
account is compatible with regulating those interventions in
whatever way we deem just, including banning them. The fact
that an intervention may be of prudential value to someone
does not in itself entail that it ought to be permissible. This is
because the welfarist account is not a stance on the permissibil-
ity of enhancement, it is a merely a definition of the concept.14
While it highlights well-being as a starting point for thinking
about enhanced and disabled states, how we ultimately decide
to promote an individual’s well-being and when would also be
determined by other values such as justice, as well as whatever
other values individuals or society think are relevant to ethical
decision making.1 To be clear: nothing about the welfarist
account entails that the promotion of individual well-being
trumps all other values, let alone that such a promotion should
be realised through biomedical means, as opposed to environ-
mental changes.
EXCLUDING SOCIAL PREJUDICE (AND WHY THIS FAILS)
Despite this possible response by the proponent of the welfarist
account, Kahane and Savulescu take a different track.3 4 As I
mentioned previously, they attempt to sidestep this issue of
alleged mislabels by excluding social prejudice from their defin-
ition of disability—all at the expense, I argue, of robbing the
account of its key advantage over other definitions. How do
they do this?
While they define disability broadly as any state of a person’s
biology or psychology which decreases the chances of leading a
good life in the relevant set of circumstances,1 their more
detailed analysis of the concept includes the addition of this
clause: ‘excluding the effect that this state has on well-being that
is due to prejudice against that person by members of that
person’s society’.3 4 Let us call the addition of this exclusionary
clause to the welfarist definition of disability ‘W2’.
What W2 entails is that if a biological property or state is
reducing the well-being of a person solely because that state is
an object of prejudice in their particular social circumstances,
then that state does not constitute a disability. That is, W2
defines disability as the effect a bodily or mental condition has
on well-being that results after we subtract the effect it has
through social prejudice.3 This means that in the case of the
dark-skinned person, or the homosexual, or the non-mutilated
woman in societies that are prejudiced against them—these are
victims of prejudice, not disability.
Indeed, Savulescu and Kahane adopt W2 precisely as ‘it
relieves us from having to claim that having dark skin colour in
a racist society is a disability’.3
To more fully grasp what W2 entails, consider a more
complex situation involving an individual bound to a wheelchair
in a society that does little to accommodate them due to preju-
dice against individuals in wheelchairs. Here W2 would hold
that, if this individual is disabled, it is not because of their loss
of well-being due to social prejudice against them, but because
their condition leaves them unable to, say, fully enjoy the bene-
fits and/or joys of bipedal mobility. These are benefits that, even
if their society had fully accommodated them, they still would
not have access to (at least given current levels of technology).
On the other hand, the added diminishment to their well-being
from social prejudice against them—that does not form part of
their disability. It is a separate issue that calls for a different
response: to combat that social prejudice. Hence, an individual
may be disabled and be a victim of prejudice against their dis-
ability, but that prejudice does not constitute part of their
disability.
But what might the implications of W2 be on the welfarist
definition of enhancement or enhanced states? While Kahane
and Savulescu do not discuss this, given that enhancements act
as alleviations of disabilities, a person with dark skin in a racist
society who undergoes an intervention to have paler skin (and
thereby, we will presume, improves their well-being) does not
become enhanced; they were never disabled to begin with.
Rather, they were affected by prejudice, not disability. The
modifying intervention has merely helped them sidestep that
prejudice, but it has not enhanced them in the way relevant to
what W2 now tries to capture: changes to our biology or psych-
ology that improve our well-being for reasons unrelated to
social prejudice.
At this point, however, it is starting to become clear the wel-
farist account is no longer purely concerned with the prudential
value of a person’s bodily and mental states. Like the other
accounts it critiques, it too has become moralised, making a
value judgement on the sorts of circumstances that are relevant
to whether states in our bodies and minds are disabling or
enhancing. On the one hand, this value judgement may allow us
to characterise disabilities in a more specific way. For instance,
imagine being told of an old friend who has immigrated to
another country only to become disabled soon after. You then
inquire about the nature of their disability, and are told that
they had fallen victim to racism. Here, the term disabled, even
if understood as a reference to well-being, seems unhelpfully
vague and distracts from what we might want to say is the real
issue: racism. But by excluding social prejudice as W2 does, we
can use the term to distinguish cases like these from ones where
the nature of someone’s disability is rooted in blameless forces,
like physical laws and/or biological facts, as well as non-
discriminatory social forces. This seems a useful and morally
relevant distinction that our concepts should be able to make.
And yet, if it is useful or morally relevant distinctions that we
are after, surely there are many more to be made. After all, this
account is concerned with any biological or psychological state,
hence whether one becomes, say, mildly cognitively impaired
(MCI) due to head trauma or due to old age is irrelevant.
According to the welfarist account, including W2, both are, or
can be, disabling. But most of us would think there is a relevant
distinction here. For instance, MCI due to a head trauma at a
young age tends to be perceived as tragic and warranting of
treatment in a way that ‘natural’ MCI in old age is not and does
not. So why not add a further clause to exclude well-being
diminishing states that we might deem natural, such as MCI
with old age? That would make the account more in line with
our intuitions about what is relevant to disabilities. In fact, in
regards to enhancements, why not add a further clause that
excludes changes to the body or mind that may exacerbate
injustice? Surely there is a relevant moral distinction between an
enhancement that comes at little cost to others in society and
ones that cause great societal harm (by, for instance, increasing
discrimination against those who refuse or cannot afford to
undergo the intervention).
The answer to these questions lies in what the welfarist
account is concerned with highlighting: a person’s well-being,
not the ethical soundness of the circumstances that increase or
diminish it. Again, it is designed to capture what is
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advantageous or disadvantageous for a person in their circum-
stances. Whether certain states ought to be advantageous or dis-
advantageous may be highly relevant questions to ask, but these
would be ethical questions about prudential value: when it
ought to be pursued, and how, and in what ways it ought to be
distributed. Yet the welfarist account is explicitly formulated to
help us non-judgementally answer the question of what states
are good or bad for a specific person in a specific circumstance.
Once we open the door to moralising this account, as this exclu-
sionary clause in W2 does, this raises the question of why we
should stop there and not add other boundaries to it. Indeed, it
raises the question of why we should even consider this account
over the other, more common, definitions that appeal to species-
typical functioning or other morally arbitrary reference points.
Also, the issue of vagueness raised in the case of the old friend
who has immigrated is not as problematic as it may seem. This is
because even the everyday language use of the term ‘disability’
tells us little on its own about the nature of any given disability. Is
it congenital? Is it due to an accident? How debilitating is it? The
answers to such questions may have substantial consequences for
how we respond to a given disability—for instance, whether we
decide to treat it, and with what degree of priority, or whether
we ought to change how our society is organised to accommo-
date it. Without these details, the label disability tells us very
little. With that in mind, the welfarist definition would not make
the concept any more vague in regards to a given individual. If
we accept the welfarist account, we merely have to add other
equally relevant questions to the ones above: is it due to old age?
Is it due to social prejudice? Indeed, is it due to non-
discriminatory social forces? It is not clear that a disability arising
due to social prejudice would be unique in its impact on how we
might perceive or respond to a person suffering from it.
Interestingly, despite adding this exclusionary clause, Savulescu
and Kahane do not deny that social prejudice is relevant to dis-
ability. They present their welfarist account as an approach that
occupies a middle ground between the medical and social models
of disability. The medical model typically characterises disability
as a stable property of a person that deviates (or falls below) the
normal functioning of the human species. It reflects some defi-
ciency or lack in motor, sensory or cognitive capacities that most
people possess, implying that such a deficiency is also a misfor-
tune that ought to be corrected if possible.11–13 In contrast, the
social model does not see disability as an impairment in itself, but
as the disadvantage or restriction of activity caused by a contem-
porary social organisation that takes little account of people who
have physical impairments.22 Hence, for the social model, it is
the unjust way through which society is organised that is disab-
ling for some.23 24
The welfarist account of disability seeks to occupy a middle
ground between these two approaches in this way: like the
medical model, it suggests that disabilities refer to conditions or
states that an individual possesses. Like the social model,
however, it denies that those conditions or states are, in and of
themselves, morally significant or unfortunate. On the other
hand, unlike the social model, the welfarist account disagrees
that the only way disabilities reduce well-being is through social
prejudice. But this is not to say that social prejudice is unrelated
to disability. As they make clear:
Advocates of the social model are no doubt right that some of
the adverse effects of deviation from the species norm are due to
such prejudice. We disagree, however, that all of the ways in
which common disabilities can reduce wellbeing are entirely due
to prejudice.4
This suggests that the disagreement here is not that social
prejudice is a separate matter to disability, but only that there is
more to disability than mere social prejudice. Given such a con-
cession, it seems strange that Kahane and Savulescu then go on
to entirely exclude social prejudice from their definition once
they formulate it as W2. The definition now appears to shun
the very essence of the social model. W2 can, in principle,
count any abiding condition as a disability, but not the one con-
dition that, for the social model, is the condition: social preju-
dice. In that way, the welfarist account no longer seems to
occupy a middle ground between the medical model and the
social one. It now fails to capture the fact that disability can
arise from how, both, discriminatory and non-discriminatory cir-
cumstances interact with our biological and psychological states
to impact our well-being positively or negatively. More import-
antly, it now retreats to the very position it is designed to avoid:
a moralised account with (what I have argued is) an arbitrary
boundary built into its definitions.
AN ALTERNATIVE TO EXCLUDING SOCIAL PREJUDICE
Is there an alternative to avoiding the mislabelling objection,
aside from excluding social prejudice? I think there is. It lies in
the fact that this account seeks to capture the nature of advanta-
geous and disadvantageous biological and psychological states.
Indeed Kahane and Savulescu want to use these terms inter-
changeably with being enhanced or disabled.1
Given this intention, note how if we were to rely solely on
the term ‘disadvantageous states’ instead of disability, the mis-
labelling objection seems to vanish. How so?
While it may seem perverse to call a dark-skinned person in a
racist society disabled, it seems far less controversial to claim
that, in a circumstance where social prejudice entails that having
dark skin is disadvantageous, it is disadvantageous to possess
dark skin. Having dark skin within such circumstances is a bio-
logical state that is disadvantageous precisely because it reduces
the chances of leading a good life. Similarly, being gay in a
homophobic society can be a disadvantageous state to the
extent that it reduces the chances of leading a good life within
such circumstances. It is coherent to say that being gay can be a
disadvantageous state, but that it should not be. Such a descrip-
tion does not have the potentially discriminatory or medicalising
connotations that arise when we use the label disabled for indi-
viduals in these situations. On the contrary, when society leaves
people at a disadvantage because of prejudice, the connotation
is that society should do better for them, not that they suffer
from an unfortunate condition that ought to be ‘fixed’.
Similarly, if one were to undergo a biomedical intervention
that allowed them to sidestep social prejudice, we can say that
they now possess more advantageous biological or psychological
states. They are advantageous for them precisely because they
enable them to sidestep that prejudice. And so, while it may
seem wrong to call a dark-skinned person who becomes paler in
a racist society enhanced, it is uncontroversial to argue that their
paler skin is an advantageous biological state to possess in their
particular circumstances, even if it is unfair that it is
advantageous.
Based on this, if the welfarist account eschews terms like
enhanced and disabled and adopts advantageous and disadvan-
tageous states, it can sidestep the mislabelling objection, and
there would be no pressure to add a clause excluding social
prejudice from its definition of disability. The benefit of this is
that it would enable the account to achieve what it sets out to
achieve: to acknowledge that prejudice can play a role in
making a certain biological or psychological state
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disadvantageous, but that disadvantageous states can certainly
also arise for reasons unrelated to prejudicial social circum-
stances. In that sense, it can indeed occupy a middle ground
between the social and medical models of disability, while also
avoiding the retreat to being a moralised account.
But how satisfactory would such a substitution in terms be?
While it may offer a simple solution, in practice it is arguably
unlikely to catch on in the voluminous disability and enhance-
ment literature, let alone in everyday speech. A compromise
may be to increasingly interchange our use of enhanced and dis-
abled with advantageous and disadvantageous states, until these
acquire a synonymous relationship.
Here, we would not necessarily be biting the bullet on the
mislabelling objection when we do periodically use the terms
enhanced and disabled. Recall that the welfarist account seeks to
undermine the notion that disability is a (necessarily) morally
significant deviation from normality, or that disability entails a
medical problem. It is, therefore, working to neutralise the
negative connotations and societal attitudes that often accom-
pany the label of being disabled. The more it is adopted, the
less likely concerns related to the mislabelling objection would
materialise.
Of course, the fact that the account seeks to undermine these
negative connotations of disability does not mean it will
succeed. It may be that even a well-being grounded expansion
of the range of states that we consider disabling will nevertheless
lead to prejudice against people with those states in the form of
aversive disablism. That is, even with an increasingly accepted
welfarist understanding of disability, we may still find that some
will subject others who are understood as disabled to subtle
forms of prejudice due to an entrenched notion that the dis-
abled are inferior to others. Whether this will likely happen if
we adopt the welfarist account and use the term disabled may
be posed as an empirical question that invites investigation.
Depending on the answer, we may wish to more confidently
embrace the terms enhanced and disabled in the welfarist sense,
or we may have to move away from them and settle for advanta-
geous and disadvantageous states instead.
Either way, we can end by reiterating that the welfarist defini-
tions of enhanced and disabled states are stipulative: they stem
from a premise that our common conceptions of these terms are
inadequate and in need of upgrading. If we do use the terms
enhanced and disabled, we may have to accept that, in some
situations, we will (perhaps somewhat awkwardly) label indivi-
duals as disabled or enhanced, despite the fact that this feels like
an alien or injustice-promoting use of these words.
In such cases, we would need to remember that we are using
these labels merely to describe states that are good or bad for a
person in a certain circumstance, not states that are good or bad
in and of themselves. In other words, we are merely describing
states in terms of prudential value. But whether a given state
ought to make a life go better or worse, and whether it ought to
be promoted or avoided and in what ways—these are questions
to be settled in conjunction with other values, such as justice.
The welfarist account offers a solid framework to help us think
about these further issues without being hampered by the
terminological controversies and conceptual confusions of other
accounts—so long, that is, as we resist the temptation of adding
the moralising baggage that comes with excluding social
prejudice.
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